



**PRISMATIC INSTITUTE**

*... to encourage aspirants*

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## **COUNTER – INSURGENCY STRATEGY**

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**Follow a path of ballot instead of path of bullet**

**1) Leadership:**

**The difference between a crowd and organised discipline unit is ‘leadership’**

History is replete with the examples that **wars are won and lost not by fighters but by the leaders.**

- **Competent leaders:** In the words of Sun Tzu, “Great results can be achieved with small forces provided those leading them are skilled at war”. Thus we should ensure that our forces are led by leaders of due competence.
- **Sweat and train together:** Even low intensity conflicts are not won by remote control leadership, rather won only when the leaders are right up there with the men. Leaders should “sweat together to bleed together” and “train together to fight together.”
- **Lead by example:** Leaders should lead by personal examples. If the leaders do not expose themselves to the danger how can they expect men to expose themselves to conflict situations?

- **Outsider leaders:** In addition, CRPF on ground is led by Inspectors and Sub Inspectors. If a man who is not trained to fight a war is made a commander of the premier counter-insurgency force, then it is a recipe for disaster.
- **Responsibility and accountability:** Responsibility and accountability are important. Unskilled leader should be removed.

## 2) Dealing with Guerrilla warfare:

- **Fight with strategy:** T.E. Lawrence. Said, "Guerrilla warfare is more scientific than a bayonet charge." Mao said, "Those who fight without method do not understand the nature of guerrilla warfare." Thus fight with appropriate method and planning.
- **Key elements of strategy:** This strategy should have key elements of (a) Flexibility & Unpredictability, (b) Surprise mobility and swift action (c) Deception.
- **Over-reliance on Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs):**
  - Over-reliance on SOPs leads to predicted routine and make forces less innovative. SOPs are broad guidelines and often become redundant after a period of time.
  - Thus the response of the security personnel should be flexible.
- **Drift like water and evaporate like gas:**
  - Counterinsurgency force should drift like water and evaporate like gas.
  - That means being mobile, and able to hit the hub centres of the insurgents with a lightning blow with surprise and then vanish.
  - This will create fear psychosis and uncertainty in the minds of the guerrilla.

## 3) Knowledge of terrain:

- Maoists are successful in their ambushes because of their deep understanding of the terrain, knowledge of where the security forces are. They use terrain effectively to maintain surprise.
- Leaders should train the forces in reading the terrain to read where the danger lies and where the opportunities exist. Genghis Khan, Alexander and Mao, all employed geography as a weapon to defeat their rivals.

## 4) Organization and unity of command:

- In CAPF men are distributed arbitrarily by a Deputy Collector or a Superintendent of Police of a district who has little idea as to how a tactical unit operates.
- This leads to dilution of cohesion of the force. The principle of unity of command is must and cohesion of unit should be maintained at all cost.

## 5) Division of Labour: Create specialisation and develop core teams to excel.

- If you expect the CRPF to rush from election duty to law and order to counter-insurgency operations, it is simply a misapplication of the force.

- Thus, the counter-insurgency units should be separated from the rest of the force. There should be a clear distinction between counter-insurgency force and law and order units. Training of men and officers should be separate for both these forces since the mandate is different.
- It will build expertise and excellence. This is what the principle of division of labour says.

#### **6) Intelligence:**

- It is easy to blame the CRPF but the root of the problem lies in poor intelligence.
- This is the reason for our CRPF personnel getting killed on a regular basis. Thus, this should be corrected.

#### **7) Reconciliation:**

- Conflicts are rarely resolved or terminated by use of force. The ultimate objective of the use of force is reconciliation and surrender.
- Thus administration should involve NGOs and citizen committees for reconciliation.

#### **8) Good governance and socio-economic development (to remove**

##### **Conditions conducive to rise of LWE)**

- We should have administration at all levels i.e. panchayat, block, district and state level.
- This administration should be accountable, corruption-free and responsive.
- For this regular social audit should be carried out.
- Administration should solve the grievances of the people and ensure socio-economic development (by undertaking Land Reforms, proper implementation of forest rights etc., development of markets where tribal can sell their agriculture produce, development of roads, communication, health, education) so that they don't fall into their propaganda.

Source :TOI